Capital punishment and the life issues

Yesterday we spoke of the importance of abortion as a respect life issue. When such is asserted, the question of the death penalty falls immediately at its heels. We wonder whether there is a direct correlation between the two or not, and further, whether we can justify capital punishment.

Abortion involves an innocent, defenseless child. Capital punishment (ideally) deals with a non-innocent person who has at least some ways in which they may defend themselves. On that point alone, we do not think they are equivalent issues. But then, there are relatively few equivalencies when discussing morals anyway. It would seem each issue must be addressed more or less on its own relative demerits against persons and societies. With that line of thought, it would appear we cannot talk about abortion and capital punishment in the same manner. So on this question alone, we would have to say that the death penalty may be applied by society and yet be moral.

It may be asserted that society as a whole and people as individuals, having the right to protect themselves, may used violent means up to killing the attacker in so doing when no other option exists. At one time we would have embraced this argument fully in defending the death penalty, but not so much now. It seems to only really apply in a sense of immediate need, and we cannot imagine anyone disagreeing with it in such a light. Surely no one would argue that we must let someone kill us when we are threatened with deadly force? Or that a nation can never defend itself even knowing such defense would lead to killing the other country's soldiers? In short, we feel that such things are not really variations on capital punishment but only what the heat of the moment may of necessity allow. Those convicts on death row are no immediate threat to us.

An interestingly religious aspect of the question, though we do not want to make this a religious discussion as such, is that in being sentenced to death we may bring out in the criminal a reality they would not otherwise appreciate. It might crystalize in them the remorse they ought to feel. Timothy McVeigh comes to mind here: he requested a priest before the death sentence was imposed, and received the Catholic sacraments. Would he have been so reticent without the very finality of his life brought so completely upon him?

Yet that question doesn't seem to have any real bearing on whether capital punishment should be employed or not. It is an after the fact sort of argument, and such things do not address whether the prior action, sentencing someone to die, is itself moral. It may offer a good side effect, a useful unintended circumstance of human action, but it cannot make the action itself legitimate.

We could go off on a perhaps necessary tangent and speak of the value of human life. But the trouble there is that we don't know that value. It's like dealing with an infinite: we know that every human life is precious but we can never know how precious. This isn't a reflection on how any individual human lives life but, rather, on the very concept of humanity. It doesn't seem particularly outlandish to say that some people are worth more than others in the practical effect they have on themselves and society; yet that is not the same as judging the value of their life in anything more than earthly attributes. The former appears to address how people have chosen to live; the latter speaks of something far different.

As the value of life is incomprehensible, it would seem presumptuous to decide who lives and who dies. Not because certain acts may not objectively call for the death of the instigator but because we cannot be aware of all the facts we need to make that judgment.

Discretion is the better part of valor, and it is always best to err on the side of caution. As we cannot know the value of a human life, we should not take it outside of abject necessity, and never as part of a criminal procedure. We must therefore conclude that the death penalty is immoral.